


# LINC-NIRVANA

The **L**BT **I**nterferometric **C**amera and  
**N**ear-**I**nfra**R**ed / **V**isible **A**daptive  
**i**nterferometer for **A**stronomy

A collaborative project of the MPIA Heidelberg, INAF-Arcetri,  
Universität zu Köln, and MPIfR Bonn

<http://www.mpia.de/LINC>






## LINC-NIRVANA

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### Safety and Hazard Management

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>1</b>	<b>Scope .....</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>2</b>	<b>Applicable documents.....</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>3</b>	<b>External Interfaces .....</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>4</b>	<b>Acronyms and abbreviations.....</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>5</b>	<b>Introduction .....</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>6</b>	<b>Categorization of Risk .....</b>	<b>4</b>
6.1	Hazard Severity Categories .....	5
6.2	Hazard Probability Categories.....	5
6.3	Hazard Acceptability Criteria.....	6
<b>7</b>	<b>LINC-NIRVANA Hazard Analysis.....</b>	<b>6</b>
7.1	Optical Bench and Substructure .....	6
7.2	Warm Fore-optics .....	7
7.3	DM Stages .....	7
7.4	Piston Mirror Unit.....	8
7.5	Dichroic Assembly .....	8
7.6	Cold Optics.....	8
7.7	Science Detector .....	9
7.8	Fringe and Flexure Tracker Optomechanics .....	9
7.9	Fringe and Flexure Tracker Detector.....	9
7.10	Cryostat .....	10
7.11	Cryo-Cooler.....	10
7.12	FP 20 Optics .....	11
7.13	Ground-Layer Wavefront Sensor .....	11
7.14	Mid-High Layer Wavefront Sensor.....	11
7.15	Patrol Camera .....	12
7.16	Calibration Unit .....	12
7.17	Electronics Cabinets.....	13
7.18	Control Room Components.....	13
<b>8</b>	<b>Conclusion.....</b>	<b>13</b>

## 1 Scope

This document addresses potential risks to LBT observatory personnel presented by the LINC-NIRVANA instrument, as well as potential hazards to the instrument itself. We characterize these risks both by their severity and by how frequently they are likely to occur. In all instances, a priori and a posteriori mitigation measures can reduce the impact of hazardous events.

## 2 Applicable documents

No.	Title	Number & Issue
1	LINC-NIRVANA Preliminary Design Review	N/A
2	Science-Technical Requirements	LN-MPIA-FDR-GEN-003
3	Operations / Maintenance Requirements	LN-MPIA-FDR-GEN-004

## 3 External Interfaces

Item	Short description
Not applicable	

## 4 Acronyms and abbreviations

HW	Hardware
PDR	Preliminary Design Review
SW	Software

## 5 Introduction

LINC-NIRVANA is a large, complicated instrument with a substantial number of subsystems. The assembly and operation of such an instrument inevitably involves some risk to personnel, observatory facilities, and LINC-NIRVANA itself. In this chapter, we address safety and hazard management.

## 6 Categorization of Risk

Each risk factor has an associated assessment of the gravity or seriousness of the event, and of how often it is likely to occur. Clearly high risk, high likelihood events are unacceptable, but there are no formal LBT requirements in this area. We therefore base our safety assessment on a

system similar to that developed at the European Southern Observatory (document VLT-SPE-ESO-10000-0017).

## 6.1 Hazard Severity Categories

The following table defines the categories for hazard severity:

Category	Description	Definition (personnel)	Definition (equipment)
1	Catastrophic	Death	Equipment cannot be recovered at reasonable cost, or is out of operation for more than 4 weeks
2	Critical	Severe injury or severe occupational illness	Equipment can be recovered with outside assistance and/or a period less than 4 weeks is necessary
3	Marginal	Minor injury or minor occupational illness	Equipment can be repaired by LBTO staff and/or is out of operation for up to one week
4	Negligible	Very minor injury or very minor occupational illness	Equipment can be readily repaired in less than one day by LBTO staff

## 6.2 Hazard Probability Categories

The following table defines the categories of likelihood of occurrence for hazardous events:

Category	Likelihood	Description
A	Frequent	Likely to occur more than once per year
B	Probable	Will occur 6-10 times during the lifetime of the instrument
C	Occasional	Will occur 2-5 times during the lifetime of the instrument
D	Remote	Unlikely, but possible to occur once during the instrument lifetime
E	Improbable	So unlikely that it can be assumed never to occur

### 6.3 Hazard Acceptability Criteria

Clearly, catastrophic or frequent hazards are unacceptable, yet there is no way to guarantee zero risk for all occurrences. The following table establishes combined severity-likelihood categories, and sets standards for acceptability by the LBT Observatory:

	1 - Catastrophic	2 - Critical	3 - Marginal	4 - Negligible
A- Frequent	1/A	2/A	3/A	4/A
B - Probable	1/B	2/B	3/B	4/B
C - Occasional	1/C	2/C	3/C	4/C
D - Remote	1/D	2/D	3/D	4/D
E - Improbable	1/E	2/E	3/E	4/E

Acceptability Categories:

Unacceptable risk under any circumstances
Undesirable, requiring explicit LBTO approval
Acceptable, but should be reviewed by LBTO
Acceptable without LBT Observatory review

## 7 LINC-NIRVANA Hazard Analysis

This section lists potential hazards associated with LINC-NIRVANA. These include potential risks to personnel and equipment (P / E in list below), as well as an assessment of the severity and likelihood of the event. The items also include mitigation measures to reduce these hazards.

Since LINC-NIRVANA is such a large and complex instrument, we evaluate the hazards on a component by component basis. Figure 7.1 shows the logical breakdown of the instrument for this purpose.

### 7.1 Optical Bench and Substructure

Hazard: (P/E) Accident during transportation and installation

Category: 1/E – Catastrophic / Improbable

Mitigation: Proper handling procedures, skilled crane operators

Hazard: (E) Collision of equipment with bench and substructure

Category: 2-4/D Critical-Negligible / Remote to

Mitigation: Proper handling procedures, instrument protective housing

Hazard: (P) Collision of personnel with bench and substructure

Category: 4/B Negligible / Probable

Mitigation: Warning markers (yellow/black), protective headgear




Figure 7.1 – Functional Block Diagram of LINC-NIRVANA

## 7.2 Warm Fore-optics

This includes the annular mirror (AM), and the two lens groups associated with the collimator (C1, C2).

Hazard: (E) Dropping or impacting optical components

Category: 1-2/E – Catastrophic-Critical / Improbable

Mitigation: Proper shipping and handling procedures, protective instrument housing

Hazard: (E) Contamination of optical surfaces

Category: 4/B – Negligible/Probable

Mitigation: Cleanliness procedures, protective instrument housing

## 7.3 DM Stages

Hazard: (E) Dropping or impacting deformable mirrors

Category: 1-2/E – Catastrophic-Critical / Improbable

Mitigation: Proper shipping and handling procedures, mirror covers, protective instrument housing

Hazard: (E) Contamination of optical surfaces

Category: 4/B – Negligible/Probable

Mitigation: Cleanliness procedures, protective instrument housing

Hazard: (P) Crushing or pinching of extremities during mechanical stage motions

Category: 3/D – Marginal / Remote

Mitigation: Proper procedures, Emergency stop buttons

## **7.4 Piston Mirror Unit**

Hazard: (E) Dropping or impacting piston mirror

Category: 1-2/E – Catastrophic-Critical / Improbable

Mitigation: Proper shipping and handling procedures, mirror cover, protective instrument housing

Hazard: (E) Contamination of optical surfaces

Category: 4/B – Negligible/Probable

Mitigation: Cleanliness procedures, protective instrument housing

## **7.5 Dichroic Assembly**

Hazard: (E) Dropping or impacting dichroic mirrors

Category: 1-2/E – Catastrophic-Critical / Improbable

Mitigation: Proper shipping and handling procedures, protective instrument housing

Hazard: (E) Contamination of optical surfaces

Category: 4/B – Negligible/Probable

Mitigation: Cleanliness procedures, protective instrument housing

## **7.6 Cold Optics**

Hazard: (E) Thermal shock

Category: 1-2/E – Catastrophic-Critical / Improbable

Mitigation: Temperature control, cryogenic design, compliant mountings, material selection

Hazard: (E) Damage by window implosion debris

Category: 2/E – Critical / Improbable

Mitigation: Overspecification of window, proper vacuum procedures

Hazard: (E) Dropping or impacting cold optics

Category: 1-2/E – Catastrophic-Critical / Improbable

Mitigation: Proper shipping and handling procedures

## **7.7 Science Detector**

Hazard: (E) Thermal shock

Category: 1-2/E – Catastrophic-Critical / Improbable

Mitigation: Temperature control, thermal mass

Hazard: (E) Electrostatic damage

Category: 1/E – Catastrophic / Improbable

Mitigation: Proper electrostatic handling procedures

## **7.8 Fringe and Flexure Tracker Optomechanics**

Hazard: (E) Dropping or impacting cold optics

Category: 1-2/E – Catastrophic-Critical / Improbable

Mitigation: Proper shipping and handling procedures, interlocks

Hazard: (E) Mechanical damage due to jammed or interfering parts

Category: 2-3/D – Critical-Marginal / Remote

Mitigation: Hardware and software interlocks, thorough testing

Hazard: (P) Crushing or pinching of extremities during mechanical stage motions (during testing phase only)

Category: 3/D – Marginal / Remote

Mitigation: Proper procedures, Emergency stop buttons

## **7.9 Fringe and Flexure Tracker Detector**

Hazard: (E) Thermal shock to detector

Category: 1-2/E – Catastrophic-Critical / Improbable

Mitigation: Temperature control, thermal mass

Hazard: (E) Electrostatic damage to detector

Category: 1/E – Catastrophic / Improbable

Mitigation: Proper electrostatic handling procedures

## 7.10 Cryostat

Hazard: (E) Implosion of vacuum vessel

Category: 1/E – Catastrophic/Improbable

Mitigation: Over-specification in design of vessel and entrance windows

Hazard: (P) Injury due to implosion of vacuum vessel

Category: 2-3/E – Critical-Marginal/Improbable

Mitigation: Over-specification in design of vessel and entrance windows

Hazard: (P/E) Explosion of vacuum vessel

Category: 1/E – Catastrophic/Improbable

Mitigation: Over-specification in design of vessel, burst valve, emergency pumping

Hazard: (E) Failure of roughing or turbomolecular pump

Category: 3/D – Marginal/Remote

Mitigation: Software interlocks, emergency pumping procedures

Hazard: (E) Contamination of cold components (including 7.6-7.9 above)

Category: 4/C – Negligible/Occasional

Mitigation: Clean-room conditions for working in cryostat

## 7.11 Cryo-Cooler

Hazard: (P/E) Accident during transportation, installation, or removal of compressor/controller

Category: 1/E – Catastrophic / Improbable

Mitigation: Proper handling procedures, skilled crane operators

Hazard: (P) Electrocution by compressor/controller

Category: 1-2/E – Catastrophic-Critical / Improbable

Mitigation: Proper procedures, safety standards compliance, interlocks, warning labels, emergency shutoff button

Hazard: (E) Contamination of cryogenic fluids

Category: 3/C – Marginal/Occasional

Mitigation: Regular maintenance

Hazard: (E) Leakage of cryogenic fluids inside cryostat

Category: 2-3/D – Critical-Marginal/Remote

Mitigation: Design, leak testing, emergency pumping

Hazard: (E) Leakage of cryogenic fluids outside cryostat

Category: 3/C – Marginal/Occasional

Mitigation: Design, regular maintenance, proper cryogenic procedures

Hazard: (P) Injury due to contact with cryogenic fluids

Category: 3-4/C – Marginal-Negligible/Occasional

Mitigation: Proper cryogenic handling procedures, localization and repair of leaks

## **7.12 FP 20 Optics**

This includes the field-rotation “K Mirror”

Hazard: (E) Dropping or impacting optical components

Category: 1-2/E – Catastrophic-Critical / Improbable

Mitigation: Proper shipping and handling procedures, protective instrument housing

Hazard: (E) Contamination of optical surfaces

Category: 4/B – Negligible/Probable

Mitigation: Cleanliness procedures, protective instrument housing

## **7.13 Ground-Layer Wavefront Sensor**

Hazard: (P/E) Accident during transportation, installation, or removal

Category: 1/E – Catastrophic / Improbable

Mitigation: Proper handling procedures, skilled crane operators

Hazard: (P) Crushing or pinching of extremities during mechanical stage motions

Category: 3/D – Marginal / Remote

Mitigation: Proper procedures, Emergency stop buttons

Hazard: (E) Dropping or impacting optical components

Category: 1-2/E – Catastrophic-Critical / Improbable

Mitigation: Proper shipping and handling procedures, software and hardware interlocks

Hazard: (E) Contamination of optical surfaces

Category: 4/B – Negligible/Probable

Mitigation: Cleanliness procedures

## **7.14 Mid-High Layer Wavefront Sensor**

Hazard: (P/E) Accident during transportation, installation, or removal

Category: 1/E – Catastrophic / Improbable

Mitigation: Proper handling procedures, skilled crane operators

Hazard: (P) Crushing or pinching of extremities during mechanical stage motions

Category: 3/D – Marginal / Remote

Mitigation: Proper procedures, Emergency stop buttons

Hazard: (E) Dropping or impacting optical components

Category: 1-2/E – Catastrophic-Critical / Improbable

Mitigation: Proper shipping and handling procedures, software and hardware interlocks, instrument protective housing

Hazard: (E) Contamination of optical surfaces

Category: 4/B – Negligible/Probable

Mitigation: Cleanliness procedures, instrument protective housing

## 7.15 Patrol Camera

Hazard: (E) Dropping or impacting optical components

Category: 1-2/E – Catastrophic-Critical / Improbable

Mitigation: Proper shipping and handling procedures, instrument protective housing

Hazard: (E) Contamination of optical surfaces

Category: 4/B – Negligible/Probable

Mitigation: Cleanliness procedures, instrument protective housing

Hazard: (E) Thermal shock to detector

Category: 1-2/E – Catastrophic-Critical / Improbable

Mitigation: Temperature control, thermal mass

Hazard: (E) Electrostatic damage to detector

Category: 1/E – Catastrophic / Improbable

Mitigation: Proper electrostatic handling procedures

Hazard: (E) Damage by window implosion debris

Category: 2/E – Critical / Improbable

Mitigation: Overspecification of window, proper vacuum procedures

## 7.16 Calibration Unit

Hazard: (P) Crushing or pinching of extremities during mechanical stage motions

Category: 3/D – Marginal / Remote

Mitigation: Proper procedures, Emergency stop buttons

Hazard: (E) Dropping or impacting optical components

Category: 1-2/E – Catastrophic-Critical / Improbable

Mitigation: Proper shipping and handling procedures, protective instrument housing

Hazard: (E) Contamination of optical surfaces

Category: 4/B – Negligible/Probable

Mitigation: Cleanliness procedures, protective instrument housing

Hazard: (P) Eye injury from laser radiation

Category: 3/D – Marginal/Remote

Mitigation: Safety procedures, low energy density, protective housing

## 7.17 Electronics Cabinets

Hazard: (P/E) Accident during transportation, installation, or removal

Category: 1/E – Catastrophic / Improbable

Mitigation: Proper handling procedures, skilled crane operators

Hazard: (P) Electrocution

Category: 1-2/E – Catastrophic-Critical / Improbable

Mitigation: Proper procedures, safety standards compliance, interlocks, warning labels, emergency shutoff button

Hazard: (E) Loss of external cooling

Category: 3/C – Marginal / Occasional

Mitigation: Software and hardware interlocks, emergency shutoff button

Hazard: (E) Damage by cooling liquid leakage

Category: 2-3/D – Critical-Marginal / Remote

Mitigation: Software and hardware interlocks, emergency shutoff button

## 7.18 Control Room Components

Hazard: (P/E) Accident during transportation, installation, or removal

Category: 2-4/D – Critical-Negligible / Remote

Mitigation: Proper handling and installation procedures, safety standards compliance

## 8 Conclusion

All of the risk factors are acceptable, although many will require consultation with the LBT Observatory prior to delivery of the instrument to the mountain.